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Abstract 
 
This paper uses a numerical actuarial model to compare pension replacement 
rates between old and new policies of China. I investigate several cases under 
different situations, and the results indicate that the new policy is not a Pareto 
improvement. In most cases, the male retirees benefit from the transition, while 
female retirees suffer a pension reduction, especially the women working in 
blue-collar jobs. However, since the replacement level under old policy is not 
superfluous, in general, the new pension policy should give the retirees at least 
equal well-being. 
 
In order to find the general way to raise replacement rates, I apply the model 
for non-continuous employment careers. The calculation which is in line with 
the existing economic situation in China shows that a suitable plan could be 
postponing female retirement age step by step while raising accumulation rate 
in individual pension accounts by 2 or 3 percent points. 
 
 
IV 
CONTENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................1 
2. PENSION REFORM IN CHINA......................................................................................................4 
2.1 FIRST ESTABLISHMENT (1952-1977) ...............................................................................................4 
2.2 RE-ESTABLISHMENT (1978-1990)....................................................................................................5 
2.3 RE-DESIGN (1991 TILL NOW) ...........................................................................................................6 
2.3.1 1991 Reform.........................................................................................................................6 
2.3.2 1997 Policy ...........................................................................................................................7 
2.3.3 2005 Policy .........................................................................................................................10 
2. 4 CHINESE SYSTEM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE........................................................................ 11 
3 COMPARISONS BETWEEN 1997 POLICY AND 2005 POLICY ..............................................14 
3.1 ACCUMULATION RATE RISE IN SOCIAL POOL .................................................................................15 
3.2 CHANGES IN BENEFITS FROM SOCIAL POOL ..................................................................................17 
3.3 DECREASE IN INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT PENSION..............................................................................18 
3.4 THE INFLUENCE OF THE TRANSITION TO A SINGLE RETIREE ..........................................................18 
4. MODELING APPROACH - THE REPLACEMENT RATE.......................................................20 
4.1 CONTRIBUTIONS AND GROWTH IN INDIVIDUAL PENSION ACCOUNT..............................................21 
4.2 PENSION AND REPLACEMENT RATE IN THE FIRST RETIREMENT YEAR...........................................22 
4.2.1 Pension and Replacement Rate under 1997’s Policy ..................................................22 
4.2.2 Pension and Replacement Rate under 2005’s Policy ..................................................23 
4.3 CALIBRATION OF THE MODEL........................................................................................................23 
4.3.1 Policy Fixed Parameters...................................................................................................23 
4.3.2 Flexible Parameters ..........................................................................................................25 
4.3.3 Main Groups of workers ...................................................................................................26 
5. NUMERICAL RESULTS ................................................................................................................27 
5.1 RESULTS UNDER CONTINUOUS EMPLOYMENT ...............................................................................27 
5.1.1 Replacement Rates under Two Policies when i= ...................................................27 g
5.1.2 Replacement Rates under Two Policies when i≠ ...............................................29 g
5.2 RESULTS UNDER NON-CONTINUOUS EMPLOYMENT.......................................................................34 
5.2.1 Retirement Age and Working Life Length while ≥ .......................................35 2Rρ 1Rρ
5.2.2 Higher Accumulation Rates..............................................................................................37 
5.2.3 The Combination of Higher Retirement Age and Accumulation Rates......................39 
6. CONCLUSIONS...............................................................................................................................42 
REFERENCE .......................................................................................................................................45 
APPENDIX ...........................................................................................................................................47 
 
V 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Big Improvement of Coverage Due to 1991 Reform 
Table 2: Coverage and Contribution Rates, Compared to Selected World 
Regions 
Table 3: Average Gross Replacement Rates (%) by Earnings Level, Mandatory 
Pension Programs, Men (Percentage of individual pre-retirement gross 
earnings), Compared to Selected World Regions 
Table 4: Retirement Age, Compared to Selected Asian Economics 
Table 5: Contributions and benefits under two policies 
Table 6: Actuarial Factor of Different Retirement Ages 
Table 7: Contribution Rates in 1997 Policy 
Table 8: Replacement Rates of Social Pool Pension under Two Policies 
Table 9: The Actuarial Factor GR
Table10: Three Types of Workers 
Table 11: Replacement Rates (%) under Two Policies 
Table 12 Gender Difference in the Effects of Policy Transition 
Table 13: Replacement Rates under 1997 Policy when ≠ for Men  i g
Table 14: Replacement Rates under 2005 Policy when ≠ for Men i g
Table 15: Difference between Two Policies for Men (R=60) 
Table 16: Difference between Two Policies for Woman in Salaried Positions 
(R=55) 
Table 17: Difference between Two Policies for Woman in Blue- collar Jobs 
(R=50) 
Table 18: Replacement Rates under 2005 Policy when << , for Woman in 
Blue- collar Jobs (R=50) 
i g
Table 19: Replacement Rates under Non-continuous Employment 
Table 20:  under Equal Replacement Rates 2ϕ
Table 21: Replacement Rates under =9% 2ϕ
Table 22: Replacement Rates under =10% 2ϕ
Table 23: Replacement Rates under =11%2ϕ
 
VI 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: China’s Pension System 
Figure 2: Historical Review of the Pension System 
Figure 3: Structure of the Three Pillar Pension System 
Figure 4: Growth Rates of Recipients and Contributors (1990-2007) 
Figure 5: Trends in Dependency Ratio and Coverage (1989-2007) 
Figure 6: Short Comings in Individual Accounts 
Figure 7: Contribution Rates and Account Accumulation Rates in 1997 Policy 
Design 
Figure 8: Contribution Rates and Account Accumulation Rates in 2005 Policy 
Design 
Figure 9: The Relationship between Eq. (9) and (10) 
Figure 10: Replacement Rates under Two Policies when ≠ for Men (R=60) i g
Figure 11: Insufficiency under 2005’s and Possible Solutions 
 
1 
1. Introduction 
Pension system is one of the most important parts of social security, which 
ensures every person can live a suitable life after he/she retires.  
 
In People’s Republic of China (China), pension system reform is a very critical 
issue. Till now, there still hasn’t been a clear pension policy in rural China, and 
most old age persons there are supported by their children. However, for urban 
workers, due to many years effort, China has established a DC (defined 
contribution) pension system. This system, which was first defined in 1997, 
was designed to integrate the PAYG features with individual account, and 
aimed to be full funded. However, after establishment, idle individual accounts 
began to exist, and the responsibilities of different departments in 1997 system 
are not explicit. The system faces important problems both about improving 
the design and implementation, and about the transition from the old unfunded 
system to the new arrangements. 
 
In order to improve 1997 pension system, in December 2005, Chinese 
government promulgated a new policy, which aimed not only to unify the 
former pension policies which are different among provinces, but also make 
individual accounts real. (Since this policy changed much from the 1997’s, in 
this thesis, it’s considered as “new policy”. Correspondingly, the policy which is 
related to 1997 is called “old policy”). 
 
Figure 1: China’s Pension System 
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Currently most articles about China’s pension policies or other related pension 
systems are focusing on the transition from pay-as-you-go system to the 
funded system, from the macro point of view (Thomas R. Michl and Duncan K. 
Foley, 2001; John Y. Campbell, 1999). The researchers at the social policy 
division of the OECD pay lot attentions to China’s pension system. Peter 
Whiteford (2003) and Salditt, F., P. Whiteford and W. Adema (2007) 
investigated pension reform in China and did some comparisons between 
China and other countries. However, they used descriptive qualitative analysis 
other than quantitative analysis. Xiaojun Wang (2001) applied an actuarial 
model to calculate the pension replacement rates from 2000 to 2050 in China, 
but he focused on actuarial evaluations under different parameters. There is 
lack of research about the influence of the transition for a single retiree. Lin 
and Ding (2007) and Zhang (2008) compared the two policies by actuarial 
models. The results of Lin and Ding showed that the 2005 policy was an 
improvement; however, they only considered the case under a high wage 
growth rate and a low rate of return on investment. Zhang indicated that the 
new policy would lead to insufficiency under non-continuous employment and 
equal rates, but hadn’t considered other situations. This paper will introduce a 
simple model to analyze the differences per person between the two 
arrangements under richer set of policy parameters. 
 
There are six chapters in this thesis.  
 
First chapter is introduction, containing research background, structure of the 
paper and the methods used further. 
 
In the second chapter, I expound the process of China’s pension reform and 
the related concepts of pension system, focusing on the period 3, which is 
discussed in modeling approach later.  
 
In the third chapter, I compare the features of new and old policies; especially 
in details the policy transition effects for retirees. The comparisons are 
performed in the differences of contribution rates and benefits, both from social 
pool and individual accounts. 
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In order to analyze the exact quantitative effects of new policy to a single 
retiree, an actuarial model is defined in chapter 4, which is followed by 
calibration.  
 
Based on the calibrated parameters, I use Excel to perform numerical analysis 
and to calculate the replacement rates under several situations. The results 
presented in Chapter 5 indicate that males will benefit from new policy slightly 
while females will suffer from reduction in pension, especially female workers 
in blue-collar jobs. The difference between males and females is mainly 
because the retirement age, which is strictly regulated. Cases under 
non-continuous employment will indicate possible ways to raise the 
replacement rates, which include adjusting the statutory retirement ages, 
raising the contribution rate or the combination of both.  
 
The last chapter contains the conclusion of results and policy suggestions. 
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2. Pension Reform in China 
Figure 2: Historical Review of the Pension System 
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2.1 First Establishment (1952-1977) 
People’s Republic of China was founded in October 1949, and its first pension 
policy, which was called “Regulations on Labor Insurance” (1952 Regulations), 
was promulgated in February 1952. The Regulations were patterned after the 
Soviet model and they covered nearly all urban workers. The main concept of 
the regulation was that the DB (defined benefit) pensions of all urban retirees 
were fully financed by government. 
 
The statutory retirement ages of workers were first defined in the 1952 
Regulations, and had been in effect till today. Male workers are eligible for a 
pension at age 60. For female workers the qualifying age is either 50 or 55 
(according to the sectors which they worked in: in “blue-collar jobs” it is 50 
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while in “salaried positions” it is 55”). The pension of a single person was 
typically 50 to 70 percent of his/her standard wage of the preceding working 
year. The replacement rate was depended on the number of years he/she was 
in employment, with the minimum employment length of 25 years for males; 
and 20 years for females. 
 
The Regulations were almost abolished during the Culture Revolution 
(1966-1976) since the pension fund financed by government was considered 
as a violation of communism principles. During these years, individual 
enterprises became responsible for pension provision. Moreover, there were 
no policies or laws to regulate the behavior of enterprises. Therefore, most 
workers kept working after reaching retirement ages and postponed 
retirements for many years. 
 
This situation caused a very serious problem after Culture Revolution. There 
were no national or local pension funds while hundreds of thousand of workers 
needed to retire in 1976. Moreover, there were also many younger workers 
seeking for jobs, who had been sent to rural China during the Cultural 
Revolution and were returning to the cities after 1976.  
2.2 Re-establishment (1978-1990) 
In 1978 the State Council amended the retirement components of the “Labor 
Insurance Regulations” (1978 Amendments) to encourage workers who had 
already achieved their retirement ages or nearly achieved this ages to leave 
the labor force. As compensation, the one who retired could send one of 
his/her children to the same company as a full time worker, and the retiree 
himself/herself could get a pension about 60 to 75 percent of his/her standard 
wage. The 1978 amendments formalized the practices of enterprises bearing 
full responsibility for all of the labor insurance benefits (including old age 
retirement plans) for employees (Fuery, M., Stanton, D. and Walters, C., 1996). 
 
After the Amendments, the number of pensioners nearly doubled in 1978-1979. 
The unemployment issue seemed to have been solved. However, what 
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followed was a huge increase in pension expenditures. The pension 
expenditures increased almost 19 times between 1978 and 1988 while the 
ratio of pensioners to workers changed from 30.3 workers per pensioner (1978) 
to 6.4 (1988)(Chai, 1992).  
 
To reduce the costs for enterprises and to establish a more effective pension 
system, the Chinese government first included individual contributions in the 
pension system in 1986 Regulations, which prescribed all new employees to 
contribute 3 percent of their standard wages to social pension fund and the 
employers to top it up with 15 percent of the wage. Meanwhile, a new 
institution called Social Insurance Agencies (SIA) was founded to collect and 
administrate pension funds. At the beginning of 1990s, most cities and 
counties had their own SIAs. 
 
In this period, there was no unified pension system. SIAs were just local 
institutions at city or county level. Their responsibilities were to collect and 
administrate pension funds in pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. 
2.3 Re-design (1991 till now) 
2.3.1 1991 Reform 
From the beginning of 1990s, ageing problem becomes more and more 
serious in China. The old PAYG system was difficult to be self-sufficient and 
caused inequality among different parts of the country. At the same time, 
“Reform” became very popular in all areas of China’s economy. In 1991, a 
pension policy named “Resolution on the Reform of the Pension System for 
Enterprise Workers” (1991 Resolution) was published. In the Resolution, the 
State Council first aimed to establish a unified three pillar pension system. 
These were a basic pension for all retirees jointly financed by the state, 
enterprises and the workers; a supplementary scheme funded by the 
enterprises from their trading surplus; and accounts funded by individual 
workers on a voluntary basis, payable at retirement as a lump sum (Whiteford, 
2003).  
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The significant development after 1991 Resolution was large expansion of 
pension coverage. The coverage of pension insurance of urban employees 
rose from 38.9% to 52.9% in the first year and kept growing from then on (see 
Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Big Improvement of Coverage Due to 1991 Reform 
 
Data from: China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2008. 
 
However, since the 1991 Resolution still encouraged provinces to develop 
their own new fully funded programs, the Three Pillar system in 1991 
Resolution had been more like a guideline than a plan until 1997.  
2.3.2 1997 Policy 
Because under 1991 Resolution, the social security system designs and the 
relative funds were both at the province level, in 1997, the State Council 
promulgated “Decision of the State Council on Establishment of Unified Basic 
Old Age Insurance System for Enterprise Staff and Workers” (1997 Policy), 
which approved a plan to finally establish a unified nationwide basic pension 
system - Three Pillar system to replace all former programs in provinces by the 
end of the 20th century. Since the second pillar “enterprise annuity” and the 
third pillar “individual saving” are both voluntary and of private sector, the 
central government is focusing on the first component, the basic pension, 
which is funded through a national pension fund (NPF; included in the National 
Social Security Fund, NSSF) for more people (See Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: Structure of the Three Pillar Pension System 
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Due to 1991 reform, the coverage of pension system increased significantly. 
However, since ageing problem and different regulations among provinces, the 
growth rate of recipients was much higher than that of contributors for many 
years (See Figure 4). Therefore, in phase 1 (1991-1997) of Period 3, the 
dependency ratio dropped down quickly while the coverage expanded (See 
Figure 5). 
 
Figure 4: Growth Rates of Recipients and Contributors (1990-2007) 
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Data from: Appendix 1 
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Since 1997 Policy introduced a unified funded pension system and began to 
cover more workers from institutions and state organizations, the number of 
contributors started to increase from1998, while the growth rate of the number 
of recipients kept around 6.5%. The difference between the two ratios reduced. 
Therefore, from 1998, because the coverage rate kept rising, the expansion of 
the system stopped the decrease of the dependency ratio and had kept it 
around 3 for ten years (See Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Trends in Dependency Ratio and Coverage (1989-2007) 
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Data from: Appendix 1 
 
The 1997 Policy also prescribed that both the employers and the employees 
should contribute to the national pension fund. The employees’ contributions 
were no longer voluntary. All of the employees’ contributions and part of the 
employers’ contributions goes to the employees’ individual accounts (up to 
11% of the preceding year’s average standard wages), the rest goes to the 
social pool for redistribution (more details in Chapter 3). The social pool works 
on a pay-as-you-go basis while the individual accounts are fully funded, so this 
arrangement is also known as “partially privatizing”. The addition of mandatory 
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employees’ contributions aimed to reduce the expenditure of the government 
and make the pension fund to be balanced.  
2.3.3 2005 Policy 
The social pool and the individual accounts were to be managed in segregated 
accounts by the system design. However, in practice, when the expenditure 
was over the income in social pool, fund managers usually drew from 
individual accounts, which resulted in short-comings in individual accounts 
(See Figure 6). This resulted in a fraction of individual accounts which became 
“idle accounts”. The sum of short-comings in the individual accounts was 14 
billion (CNY) in 1997, 45 billion (CNY) in 1998, and over 100 billion (CNY) at 
the end of 1999. The total revenue of pension fund in these years was 133.8 
billion (CNY) in 1997, 145.9 billion (CNY) in 1998, and 196.5 billion (CNY) in 
1999. 70%-80% of the short-comings should be compensated by both central 
and local government later.1
 
Figure 6: Short Comings in Individual Accounts 
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1 Data from: Institute for Social Insurance Studies, China, Report 2000 
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Therefore, Chinese central government began to do some experiments to 
develop a long-term effective pension system from December 2000. The first 
step was to reduce the accumulation rate of individual account from 11% to 8% 
while keeping the total contribution rate at the level of 25% in Liaoning 
province in 20012, and then to expand this to all the Northeastern three 
provinces (Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang) by the end of 2003. According to 
Zheng (2006), the experiments proved to be successful. Most of these 
managerial goals have been achieved and individual accounts became fully 
funded in Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces.  
  
Thanks to the successful outcome and China’s 11th five-year plan (2006-2011) 
to create a “harmonious society”, in December 2005, State Council 
Promulgated “Decision on Improving the System of Basic Old-age Pension 
Insurance for Enterprise Staff and Workers” (2005 Policy) to implement the 
new contribution and benefit method nationwide. 
2. 4 Chinese System in Comparative Perspective 
Based on the comparisons with other regions of the world in Table 2, 3 & 4, the 
following conclusions about Chinese pension system can be made: 
 
1) The coverage rate of the pension system is lower than those of OECD 
countries, but close to or more than those of other regions. However, the 
coverage rate of China is just the participants per urban labor force; while 
more than half of Chinese population lives in the rural China and are not 
included in the pension system coverage calculations (See Table 2). 
 
2) The contribution rates in China are very high compared to those of other 
regions. But these contribution rates contain both employers’ contribution 
and employees’ contribution, and these are policy target values (See Table 
2, more in Sec. 3.4). 
 
 
                                                        
2 According to Document 42 (State Council, 2000) and Articles 79 (State Council, 2001) 
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Table 2: Coverage and Contribution Rates, Compared to Selected World 
Regions 
Region Coverage (%) Contribution Rates (PensionContributions/Wages; %)
China 
1995 58* 20
1999 56* 25
2005 64* 28
OECD 90 19
Range 79-98 6-35 
Asia and the Pacific 26 14
Range 3-73 3-40 
Central and Eastern
Europe and Former
Soviet Union
66 22
Range 32-97 20-45 
North Africa and
Middle East 41 13
Range 30-82 3-27
Sub-Saharan Africa 6 10
Range 1-18 3-24
Latin America and
Caribbean 33 12
Range 11-82 3-29  
Data from: * are from China Statistical Yearbook 2008, only for urban employees; others 
are from Salditt, F., P. Whiteford and W. Adema (2007), PP 33, Table 8.  
 
3) The replacement rate in China seems higher than the average values of 
most of other regions; however, most retirees in other regions such as 
OECD countries have other finance supports besides mandatory pension 
programs. As I stress out before, in China the second pillar “enterprise 
annuity” and the third pillar “individual saving” are both voluntary and of 
private sector, thus the additional pension is not regular for most workers. 
Since the basic pension is the only income of most retirees in China, the 
replacement rate is not high (See Table 3). 
 
4) The statutory retirement age for female in China is lower than most of other 
Asian countries (See Table 4). 
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Table 3: Average Gross Replacement Rates (%) by Earnings Level, 
Mandatory Pension Programs, Men (Percentage of individual 
pre-retirement gross earnings), Compared to Selected World Regions 
Australia 40 France 49.4 Japan 50.3 Portugal 66.7
Austria 78.3 Germany 45.8 Korea, Rep. of 40.6 Spain 80.1
Belgium 37.3 Greece 84 Luxembourg 101.9 Sweden 64.8
Canada 42.5 Iceland 52.8 Netherlands 68.3 Switzerland 58.2
Denmark 43.3 Ireland 30.6 New Zealand 37.6 United Kingdom 37.1
Finland 71.5 Italy 78.8 Norway 52.6 United States 40.3
Average 56.4
Average 56.4
Average 77.9
Average 57.2
Bulgaria 49.7 Estonia 51.6 Lithuania 53.4 Slovak Republic 48.6
Croatia 38.4 Hungary 75.4 Poland 56.9 Turkey 87.2
Czech Republic 44.4 Latvia 58.2
Algeria 80 Egypt, Arab Rep. of 85.3 Libya 80 Tunisia 64
Bahrain 79.2 Iran, Islamic Rep. of 115.5 Morocco 70 Yemen, Rep. of 100
Djibouti 37.5 Jordan 67.5
Argentina 62.6 Costa Rica 89 El Salvador 38.7 Peru 39.1
Chile 43.8 Dominican Republic 52.6 Mexico 36 Uruguay 102.6
Colombia 50
China 59*  
High-income OECD countries
Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Middle East and North Africa
Latin America and the Caribbean
 
Data from: * is Chinese pension replacement rate in 2005, from Salditt, F., P. Whiteford 
and W. Adema (2007), PP 33; others are in 2002, from Whitehouse (2007), PP 32.  
 
Table 4: Retirement Age, Compared to Selected Asian Economics 
Males Females 
China 60 55/50 
India 58 58
Indonesia 55 55
Pakistan 60 55
Philippines 60 60
Sri Lanka 55 50
Thailand 55 55
Vietnam 60 55
Hong Kong 65 65
Korea 60 60
Malaysia 55 55
Singapore 55 55
Retirement Ages 
Country 
 
Data from: Salditt, F., P. Whiteford and W. Adema (2007), PP 33 
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3 Comparisons between 1997 Policy and 2005 Policy 
The biggest difference between the two policies is “funding individual accounts 
of the basic pension system”. The changes are both in contribution rate and in 
benefit formula. 
 
Table 5: Contributions and benefits under two policies 
  1997 Policy 2005 Policy 
Social 
Pool 
Up to 17% of employee’s 
standard wage (1)  
Up to 20% of employee’s 
standard wage  
Contributions 
(up to 28% of 
employee’s 
Wages ) 
Individual 
Account 
Up to 11% of employee’s 
standard wage  
Up to 8% of employee’s 
standard wage 
Social 
pool 
Pension 
20% of local average 
wage of the preceding 
year (if >15 years 
contribution (2)). 
1% of combining average 
wage (3) per each 
contribution year (if >15 
years contribution). 
Benefits 
Individual 
Account 
Pension 
Individual account 
terminal value divided by
10 years (120 months)(4)
Individual account terminal 
value divided by the 
actuarial factor at the 
retirement age(5)
 
Some explanations for Table 5: 
 
(1) Standard wage: not exactly the employee’s nominal basic wages; it is 
constrained by a maximum base of three times the average local (provincial) 
wages and a minimum of 60% of this average. 
 
(2) If an individual has contributed for less than 15 years, he/she will receive 
the savings from the individual account as a lump sum, no social pool pension. 
 
(3) Combining average wage: half is the local average wage of the preceding 
year; half is the employee’s standard wage of the preceding year. 
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(4) 10 years (120 months): the divisor factor 10 years (120 months) is based 
on an assumption that average post-retirement lifetime is 10 years. The 
individual account pension is drawn from the funded account in these 10 years. 
And if the retiree lives longer than 10 years, the extra individual account 
pension is paid out of the social pool. 
 
(5) The actuarial factor at the retirement age: Due to the change of life 
expectancy, the individual account divisor factor changes from the certain 
number (120 months) to an actuarial base factor varying with the retirement 
ages (see Table 6).  
Table 6: Actuarial Factor of Different Retirement Ages 
Retirement 
Age 
Actuarial Factor 
(Months) 
Retirement 
Age 
Actuarial Factor 
(Months) 
45 216 56 164 
46 212 57 158 
47 208 58 152 
48 204 59 145 
49 199 60 139 
50 195 61 132 
51 190 62 125 
52 185 63 117 
53 180 64 109 
54 175 65 101 
55 170   
Data from: the attachment of 2005 Policy, State Council [2005] No.31 
3.1 Accumulation Rate Rise in social pool  
In 1997 Policy, at first year, the employees should have contributed 4% of their 
standard wage, and then increasing by 1% every two years till the rate reached 
8% in 2005; and the employers’ total contribution rate was 20% in all the years 
1997-2005. 11% of the standard wage should have gone into the employees’ 
individual account, which meant that in 1997, the employers should have 
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contributed 7% of the standard wage to the individual account and this rate fell 
to 3% in 2005 (see Table 7 and Figure 7). 
 
Table 7: Contribution Rates in 1997 Policy 
year Individual Account (11%) Social Pool 
Total 
Contribution 
97-98 
Employees’ 
Contribution: 4% 
Employers’ 
Contribution: 7%
Employers’ 
Contribution: 13% 
24% 
99-00 
Employees’ 
Contribution: 5% 
Employers’ 
Contribution: 6%
Employers’ 
Contribution: 14% 
25% 
01-02 
Employees’ 
Contribution: 6% 
Employers’ 
Contribution: 5%
Employers’ 
Contribution: 15% 
26% 
03-04 
Employees’ 
Contribution: 7% 
Employers’ 
Contribution: 4%
Employers’ 
Contribution: 16% 
27% 
2005 
Employees’ 
Contribution: 8% 
Employers’ 
Contribution: 3%
Employers’ 
Contribution: 17% 
28% 
 
Figure 7: Contribution Rates and Account Accumulation Rates in 1997 
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Employers’ Contribution
Employees’ Contribution
Total Contribution  
Data from: Appendix 2 
 
Correspondingly, in 2005 Policy, from 2006 all the employers’ contributions 
(20%) had to go into the pay-as-you-go social pool while the individual 
accounts should be funded all by the employers (see Figure 8), which means 
3% of the standard wages transfer from individual account to social pool 
compared with 1997 Policy. 
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Figure 8: Contribution Rates and Account Accumulation Rates in 2005 
Policy Design 
Enterprises’ Contribution Rate 
= Social pool Accumulation Rate 
= 20% 
Employees’ Contribution Rate  
= Individual Account Accumulation Rate
= 8% 
Total Contribution Rate 
= Total Accumulation Rate
= 28% 
 
3.2 Changes in Benefits from Social Pool 
The Social Pool pension changed in two ways. 
 
First change is the replacement rate. In 1997 Policy (old policy), the 
replacement rate was certain, while in 2005 Policy, it is varying with the year of 
contribution. In the old policy, if the minimum contribution requirement of 15 
years reached, the retiree would get 20% of the local average wage of the 
preceding year from the social pool, no matter how many years he/she 
contributed. However, in the new policy, besides minimum contribution 
requirement, the retiree gains additional 1 percent point for each year of 
contributions. The change is meant to reward additional contribution years 
(see Table 8).  
 
Table 8: Replacement Rates of Social Pool Pension under Two Policies 
 
15 18 20 25 35 
1997 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 
2005 15% 18% 20% 25% 35% 
Contribution Years 
Policy year 
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The second change is the benefits’ base. In 1997 Policy, the base was the 
local average wage of the preceding year. In 2005, the base changes to the 
combining average wage, which contains half of the local average wage and 
half of the employee’s standard wage of the preceding year. Employees who 
were at high salary jobs will get higher pension benefits from social pool 
compared to the situation under 1997 Policy. This term is also an 
encouragement for contributions to the National Pension Fund.   
3.3 Decrease in Individual Account Pension 
For most employees who retire before 62 years old, the change from a certain 
divisor factor (10 years) to a varying actuarial factor (see Table 6) means a 
decrease in individual account pension. 
 
Meanwhile, following the discussion in Sec. 3.1, the accumulation rate of 
individual accounts is reduced from 11% to 8%. It means the terminal value of 
individual accounts under 2005 policy will be less than that under 1997 policy, 
which also leads to a decrease in individual account component. 
3.4 The Influence of the Transition to a Single Retiree 
From the analysis above, it is sure that both the accumulation rate rise in social 
pool and the pension decrease in individual account will result in a reduction of 
the total pension benefits in 2005 policy compared to 1997 policy. In the same 
time the change of the calculation rules for the benefits from Social Pool 
seems to give the advantage to retirees who had longer working years or 
higher salaries.  
 
According to OECD definition, the old-age pension replacement rate is a 
measure of how effectively a pension system provides income during 
retirement to replace earnings which were the main source of income prior to 
retirement. Therefore, to analyze the quantitative differences per person 
between the two arrangements, the total pension replacement rate is a 
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suitable measure. Before I start to lay out the model, two things should be 
clarified. 
 
First, under the new policy, the maximum of employee and employer 
contributions are set respectively to 8% and 20% of the standard wage (Sum is 
28%), but in practice there is variation in the sum, ranging from 18% to 28% of 
the total wage. In this work, I use the maximum level for calculation because it 
is prescribed in the policy and will be reached in the near future. Moreover, this 
will make the results stronger because other numerical values under 28% will 
cause higher insufficiency of the replacement rates. 
 
The other important problem rises because of system transition. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, China’s pension system has changed much for the past 60 years. 
Therefore, there are ”old” retirees and “old” employees who don’t have full 
individual accounts. The 2005 Policy divided all the workers in pension system 
into three groups. People who retired before 1997 are “old” persons; those 
who started to work but didn’t retired before 1997 are called “middle” persons; 
those who started to work after 1997 are “new” persons. Only “new” persons 
have accumulations in individual accounts from when they started work. 
Therefore, in 2005 policy regulations, the pension for “old” persons has to 
follow the regulations which were in policies before 1997, while that of “middle” 
persons has to follow 1997 Policy. Only “new” persons should obey 2005 
Policy regime, so the transition to the new policy only influences “new” 
employees. 
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4. Modeling Approach - The Replacement Rate 
Definitions 
Consider a pension for a single new retiree. Let me introduce the following 
notations: 
 
R – Retirement age 
A – The terminal value of individual pension account 
iϕ – Accumulation rate of individual pension account under i  policy (the 
superscript =1 means the old policy; =2 means the new one) i i
t – Age 
tw – Wage at age t 
a – Initial working age; the age the individual starts first job and begins to 
contribute to the pension system 
),( tas – The probability of employment and thus a contribution to the pension 
system at age t ( =1 if employed, = 0 if unemployed) ),( tas ),( tas
ti – Rate of return on investment in year t 
tg – Growth rate of wage in year t 
UR – The average number of unemployment years before retirement in the 
population 
i
RS – Social pool pension of the first retirement year under  policy (the 
superscript =1 means the old policy; =2 means the new one) 
i
i i
i
RI – Individual account pension of the first retirement year under  policy (the 
superscript =1 means the old policy; =2 means the new one) 
i
i i
i
RT – Total pension of the first retirement year under  policy (the superscript 
=1 means the old policy; =2 means the new one) 
i
i i
i
Rρ – The replacement rate at the first retirement year under  policy (the 
superscript =1 means the old policy; =2 means the new one) 
i
i i
GR – The actuarial factor of retirement age R under new policy in years (See 
Table 6 & 9) 
 
21 
4.1 Contributions and Growth in Individual Pension Account 
I depart from the actuarial calculations in (Bowers, N.L., Gerber, H.U., Hickman, 
J.C., Jones, D.A. and Nesbitt, C.J., 1997). When a worker retires at age R, the 
theoretical terminal value of his/her individual pension account is, 
                                       (1) ∑ ∏−
=
−
=
− ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +=
1 1
1 )1(),(
R
at
R
tn
nt itaswA ϕ
For example, at age u, if the worker has a job ( =1), he/she contributes to 
the pension system. The accumulation to his/her individual pension account at 
the age u is
),( uas
1−uwϕ , which is the product of accumulation rate of individual 
pension account ϕ  and the preceding year’s average wage  (According 
to Chinese pension policy, this year’s contribution is based on the preceding 
year’s average wage). 
1−uw
1−uwϕ  grows by the rates of return on investment of 
national pension fund. Therefore, when he/she retires at age R, it will be 
. ∏−
=
− +
1
1 )1(
R
un
nu iwϕ
 
Assumption A1: The rates of return on investment are equal among years, viz. 
≡ .  ti i
 
This Equation (1) simplifies to, 
                                          (2) ∑−
=
−
− +=
1
1 )1)(,(
R
at
tR
t itaswA ϕ
Equation (2) means that when the individual retires, the terminal value of 
his/her individual account is the accumulation of his/her contributions during 
working years under compound interest rate. 
 
Assumption A2: The growth rates of wage are equal among years, viz. ≡ .  tg g
 
Then it follows that,  
at
at gww
−−
− += 11 )1(  
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Similarly, we can get his/her average wage of the last working year, 
aR
aR gww
−−
− += 11 )1(  
Viz.,                       RaRa gww
−+
− += 11 )1(
Therefore,                                        (3) RtRt gww
−
−− += )1(11
Insert (3) into (2); we get the final expression of the terminal value of his/her 
individual pension account, which is, 
                        
tR
R
R
at g
itaswA
−
−
−
=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+= ∑ 11),(1
1ϕ                  (4) 
4.2 Pension and Replacement Rate in the First Retirement Year 
Since this paper aims to analyze how the new policy influences an individual’s 
pension benefit, this person should be a very “common” person. In other words, 
this common person’s wage should be the average wage, i.e. =1−Rw 1−Rw , and 
the number of years he/she is unemployed is just the average number of 
unemployment years in the population UR. 
4.2.1 Pension and Replacement Rate under 1997’s Policy 
The social pool pension is 20% of the preceding year’s average wage, 
11
1 *%20*%20 −− == RRR wwS  
The individual account pension is the terminal value divided by 10 years (the 
defined pension payment years under 1997’s), 
10/1 AIR =  
The total pension thus is 
10/*%20 1
1 AwT RR += −  
The replacement rate under 1997’s is, 
)10/(2.0/)10/*%20( 111
1
−−− +=+= RRRR wAwAwρ  
From Equation (4), we get, 
                    
tRR
at
R g
itas
−−
=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
++= ∑ 11),(1.02.0
1
11 ϕρ                 (5) 
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4.2.2 Pension and Replacement Rate under 2005’s Policy 
The social pool pension is: based on the preceding year’s average wage, 1% 
per a working year, 
111
2 *)(*%12/)(*)(*%1 −−− −−=+−−= RRRRRR wUaRwwUaRS  
The individual account pension is the terminal value divided by GR years, 
RR GAI /
2 =  
The total pension is 
RRRR GAwUaRT /*)(*%1 1
2 +−−= −  
The replacement rate under 2005’s is, 
)/(01.0*)(/]/*)(*%1[ 111
2
RRRRRRR GwAUaRwGAwUaR −−− +−−=+−−=ρ  
From Equation (4), we get, 
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4.3 Calibration of the Model 
4.3.1 Policy Fixed Parameters 
Parameter P1: ϕ – Accumulation rate of individual pension account 
 
According to the regulations discussed in Chapter 3, in 1997 policy, the 
accumulation rate of individual pension account  is 11%, so it follows, 1ϕ
                   ∑−
=
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
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1
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In 2005 policy, the accumulation rate of individual pension account  is 8%, 
so it follows, 
2ϕ
             ∑−
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−
⎟⎟⎠
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Parameter P2: a– Initial working age 
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Based on Chinese 2000 census, Zheng (2002) estimated the initial working 
ages in China, to be 19.2 for male and 19.1 for female. Since retirement and 
pension are considered on year bases in this paper, I set a = 19 in the following 
discussion.   
 
Parameter P 3: R– Retirement age 
 
According to Chinese policy, the statutory retirement age is 60 for men, 55 for 
women in salaried positions, and 50 for women in blue-collar jobs. Those 
working in designated harsh or dangerous conditions may retire five years 
earlier; senior professionals may retire five years later. As the explanation at 
the beginning of Sec. 4.2, the retiree is a common person, I assume that 
he/she will retire immediately when achieving statutory retirement age with no 
advancing or postponing. 
 
Parameter P4: GR – The actuarial factor of retirement age R under new policy 
(in years) 
 
According to Table 6, GR is as following: 
Table 9: The Actuarial Factor GR
Retirement Age GR (Years) Retirement Age GR (Years) 
45 18.00  56 13.67  
46 17.67  57 13.17  
47 17.33  58 12.67  
48 17.00  59 12.08  
49 16.58  60 11.58  
50 16.25  61 11.00  
51 15.83  62 10.42  
52 15.42  63 9.75  
53 15.00  64 9.08  
54 14.58  65 8.42  
55 14.17      
Data from: the attachment of 2005 Policy, State Council [2005] No.31 
 
25 
4.3.2 Flexible Parameters 
Parameter P5: – The probability that the individual is employed and 
contributes to the pension system at age t. 
),( tas
 
),( tas  has two values: =1 if he/she has a job; = 0 if he/she hasn’t 
a job. 
),( tas ),( tas
 
In this paper, I consider two cases.  
 
First, continuous employment: ≡1 for all years before retirement (viz. 
U
),( tas
R=0). This case is discussed in Section 5.1 
 
Second, non-continuous employment: = 0 at some years (viz. U),( tas R≠0). 
This case is discussed in Section 5.2 
 
Parameter P6: ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+
g
i
1
1 – Relation between investment interest and wage 
growth factors 
 
In the past ten years, the growth rate of nominal wage has kept above 10% per 
year, while the investment interest rate of National Social Security Fund (NSSF, 
containing National Pension Fund) is only about 3% per year on average.  
 
However, since the GDP growth is slowing down and unemployment rate is 
rising, the growth rate of wage can not maintain in that high level. On the other 
hand, NSSF have expanded the range of investment by increasing the 
proportion of abroad investment and stock market investment since 2006, so it 
is reasonable that the interest rate of NSSF investment will rise in the future. 
 
The experience of NSSF in other countries can support the assumption that 
the investment rate  can be equal to or higher than wage growth rate .  i g
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Therefore, I consider two cases when = and ≠ . i g i g
  
i = ; discussed in Section 5.1.1 & 5.2 g
 
i ≠ ; discussed in Section 5.1.2  g
4.3.3 Main Groups of workers 
According to Chinese policy, except senior professionals and those working in 
designated harsh or dangerous conditions, the workers are divided into three 
groups as shown in Table 10.  
 
Table10: Three Types of Workers 
Type Jobs Statutory Retirement Age GR in years
Male All 60 11.58 
Female 1 In salaried positions 55 14.17 
Female 2 In blue-collar jobs 50 16.25 
Data from: “Regulations on Labor Insurance” (1952 Regulations) 
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5. Numerical Results 
5.1 Results under Continuous Employment  
It is obvious that the replacement rate under non-continuous employment is 
less than that of continuous employment. And as discussed in Ch 3, the new 
policy is an advantage for retirees who had longer working careers. Thus if 
under continuous employment, the replacement rates under the new policy are 
less than those under the new one ( < ), it is sure that under 
non-continuous employment,  is also less than . Therefore I first 
consider the model under continuous employment assumption. 
2
Rρ 1Rρ
2
Rρ 1Rρ
 
Assumption B1.1: This retiree has a continuous employment before retirement; 
i.e. ≡1 for all the years (viz. U),( tas R=0). 
5.1.1 Replacement Rates under Two Policies when =  i g
Assumption B2.1: and  are equal in all the years. g i
 
Model after B2.1: Since = , we get, i g
1
1
1 =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+ −tR
g
i . 
With ≡1 and U),( tas R=0, then equation (7) will be: 
∑−
=
+=
1
1 1011.02.0
R
at
Rρ  
                     Viz.                      (9) )(011.02.01 aRR −+=ρ
In the same way, equation (8) will be: 
RR GaRaR /)(08.001.0*)(
2 −+−=ρ  
                 Viz.                  (10) )/08.001.0(*)(2 RR GaR +−=ρ
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Figure 9: The Relationship between Eq. (9) and (10) 
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Now I inset the other parameters into the equations of replacement rate to 
calculate replacement rates of different groups of workers (See Table 11). Male 
retirees benefit from the transition, while female retirees suffer a reduction in 
pension benefits, especially the women working in blue-collar jobs who retire 
at age 50. 
 
Table 11: Replacement Rates (%) under Two Policies 
Female Retiree (a=19) 
 
Male Retirees 
(R=60; a=19; 
G60=11.6) 
in salaried positions 
(R=55; G55=14.2) 
in blue-collar jobs 
(R=50; G50=16.25) 
97 Policy 65.1 59.6 54.1 
05 Policy 69.3 56.3 46.3 
Difference 4.2 -3.3 -7.8 
 
According to the analysis and assumption in the former sections, both the 
standard wage and the accumulation rate are the same between males and 
females. Moreover, their initial working ages are also equal. Therefore, the 
only factor that causes the different effects of the policy transition is the 
retirement age (see Table 12). It is clear that there is a strong correspondence 
between the available benefits and the age departure from the labor force 
(Jonathan Gruber and David Wise, 1998). 
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Table 12 Gender Difference in the Effects of Policy Transition 
Female Retiree 
  
Male Retiree 
(R=60) 
in salaried 
positions (R=55)
in blue-collar 
jobs (R=50) 
Social Pool Pension 
20% of local 
average wage of 
the preceding year
20% of local 
average wage of 
the preceding year
20% of local 
average wage of 
the preceding year1997 
Policy Individual Account 
Pension: 
)(011.0 aR −  
45.1% of local 
average wage of 
the preceding year
39.6% of local 
average wage of 
the preceding year
34.1% of local 
average wage of 
the preceding year
Social Pool Pension: 
01.0*)( aR −  
41% of local 
average wage of 
the preceding year
36% of local 
average wage of 
the preceding year
31% of local 
average wage of 
the preceding year2005 
Policy Individual Account 
Pension: 
RGaR /)(*08.0 −  
28.3% of local 
average wage of 
the preceding year
20.3% of local 
average wage of 
the preceding year
15.3% of local 
average wage of 
the preceding year
 
In the old arrangement, although women retire also 5 or 10 years earlier than 
men, since the social pool pension does not correlate with the years of 
contribution, the difference between male and female retirees is only because 
of individual account pension. However, in the new policy, the gap exists in 
both social pool and individual accounts. 
 
In conclusion, when i = , male retirees benefit from the transition, while 
female retirees suffer a pension reduction, especially the women working in 
blue-collar jobs, and the only factor that causes the different effects of the 
policy transition is the retirement age. 
g
5.1.2 Replacement Rates under Two Policies when ≠  i g
Assumption B2.2: and  are not equal in different years. g i
 
Under ≡1 and ≠ , Eq. (7) for replacement rates under 1997 policy 
will be: 
),( tas i g
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Eq. (8) for replacement rates under 2005 policy will be: 
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Now I inset the other parameters into the equations of replacement rate and 
calculate potential replacement rates for different possible values of  and  
(See Table 13&14 and Figure 10). 
i g
Table 13: Replacement Rates under 1997 Policy when ≠ for Men  i g
   i 
    1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
1% 65.1% 75.8% 89.9% 108.5% 133.1% 165.8% 209.4% 267.8% 346.2% 451.7%
2% 56.9% 65.1% 75.7% 89.6% 107.9% 132.0% 163.9% 206.5% 263.2% 339.2%
3% 50.7% 57.0% 65.1% 75.6% 89.3% 107.3% 130.9% 162.2% 203.6% 258.8%
4% 45.9% 50.8% 57.1% 65.1% 75.5% 89.0% 106.7% 129.9% 160.4% 200.9%
5% 42.1% 46.0% 50.9% 57.1% 65.1% 75.4% 88.7% 106.1% 128.9% 158.8%
6% 39.2% 42.3% 46.1% 51.0% 57.2% 65.1% 75.3% 88.4% 105.5% 127.9%
7% 36.8% 39.3% 42.4% 46.3% 51.1% 57.3% 65.1% 75.2% 88.1% 105.0%
8% 34.9% 36.9% 39.4% 42.5% 46.4% 51.2% 57.3% 65.1% 75.1% 87.9%
9% 33.3% 35.0% 37.0% 39.5% 42.6% 46.5% 51.3% 57.4% 65.1% 75.0%
g 
10% 32.0% 33.4% 35.1% 37.2% 39.7% 42.8% 46.6% 51.4% 57.4% 65.1%
 
Table 14: Replacement Rates under 2005 Policy when ≠ for Men i g
   i 
    1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
1% 69.3% 76.0% 84.8% 96.5% 111.9% 132.4% 159.7% 196.4% 245.5% 311.6%
2% 64.1% 69.3% 75.9% 84.6% 96.1% 111.2% 131.2% 157.9% 193.5% 241.1%
3% 60.2% 64.2% 69.3% 75.9% 84.5% 95.7% 110.5% 130.1% 156.1% 190.7%
4% 57.2% 60.3% 64.2% 69.3% 75.8% 84.3% 95.3% 109.9% 129.1% 154.4%
5% 54.9% 57.3% 60.4% 64.3% 69.3% 75.7% 84.1% 95.0% 109.2% 128.0%
6% 53.0% 55.0% 57.4% 60.4% 64.3% 69.3% 75.7% 83.9% 94.6% 108.6%
7% 51.5% 53.1% 55.0% 57.5% 60.5% 64.4% 69.3% 75.6% 83.7% 94.3%
8% 50.3% 51.6% 53.2% 55.1% 57.5% 60.6% 64.4% 69.3% 75.5% 83.6%
9% 49.3% 50.4% 51.7% 53.3% 55.2% 57.6% 60.6% 64.4% 69.3% 75.5%
g 
10% 48.5% 49.4% 50.5% 51.8% 53.3% 55.3% 57.7% 60.7% 64.5% 69.3%
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From the above two tables and Figure 10, we can conclude that the new policy 
is better when the rate of return on investment of Nation Pension Fund is at a 
low level. Since low interest rate and high wage growth rate is the situation in 
China now, it can be considered as a policy improvement. 
 
Figure 10: Replacement Rates under Two Policies when ≠ for Men 
(R=60) 
i g
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However, as the discussion in Sector 5.1.1, the new policy has different effects 
between men and women. By now, we can’t say that the new policy will be a 
Pareto improvement when < . i g
 
Table 15: Difference between Two Policies for Men (R=60) 
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
1% 4.2% 0.2% -5.1% -12.0% -21.2% -33.4% -49.7% -71.4% -100.7% -140.0%
-5.0% -11.8% -20.8% -32.7% -48.6% -69.7% -98.1%
-4.9% -11.5% -20.4% -32.0% -47.5% -68.1%
-4.7% -11.3% -20.0% -31.4% -46.5%
-4.6% -11.1% -19.6% -30.8%
-4.5% -10.9% -19.2%
-4.4% -10.7%
-4.3%
2% 7.2% 4.2% 0.2%
3% 9.6% 7.2% 4.2% 0.3%
4% 11.3% 9.5% 7.2% 4.2% 0.3%
5% 12.7% 11.3% 9.5% 7.2% 4.2% 0.3%
6% 13.9% 12.7% 11.3% 9.4% 7.1% 4.2% 0.4%
7% 14.7% 13.8% 12.6% 11.2% 9.4% 7.1% 4.2% 0.4%
8% 15.5% 14.7% 13.8% 12.6% 11.2% 9.4% 7.1% 4.2% 0.5%
9% 16.0% 15.4% 14.6% 13.7% 12.6% 11.1% 9.3% 7.1% 4.2% 0.5%
10% 16.5% 16.0% 15.4% 14.6% 13.7% 12.5% 11.1% 9.3% 7.0% 4.2%
i
g
 
Data from: Table 13 & Table 14 
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Table 16: Difference between Two Policies for Woman in Salaried 
Positions (R=55) 
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
1% -3.3% -7.3% -12.3% -18.8% -26.9% -37.4% -50.8% -68.1% -90.4% -119.1%
-0.2% -3.3% -7.3% -12.2% -18.5% -26.6% -36.8% -50.0% -66.8% -88.4%
-0.2% -3.3% -7.2% -12.1% -18.3% -26.2% -36.3% -49.1% -65.5%
-0.2% -3.3% -7.2% -12.0% -18.1% -25.9% -35.7% -48.3%
-0.3% -3.3% -7.1% -11.9% -17.9% -25.6% -35.2%
-0.3% -3.3% -7.1% -11.8% -17.8% -25.2%
-0.3% -3.3% -7.1% -11.7% -17.6%
-0.3% -3.3% -7.0% -11.6%
-0.4% -3.3% -7.0%
-0.4% -3.3%
2%
3% 2.3%
4% 4.2% 2.2%
5% 5.8% 4.2% 2.2%
6% 7.1% 5.7% 4.1% 2.2%
7% 8.1% 7.0% 5.7% 4.1% 2.1%
8% 9.0% 8.0% 7.0% 5.6% 4.0% 2.1%
9% 9.7% 8.9% 8.0% 6.9% 5.6% 4.0% 2.0%
10% 10.3% 9.6% 8.8% 7.9% 6.8% 5.5% 3.9% 2.0%
i
g
 
Data from: Appendix 3 
 
Table 17: Difference between Two Policies for Woman in Blue- collar 
Jobs (R=50) 
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
1% -7.8% -11.1% -15.2% -20.1% -26.2% -33.7% -43.0% -54.5% -68.7% -86.3%
-5.2% -7.8% -11.1% -15.1% -20.0% -26.0% -33.3% -42.4% -53.6% -67.5%
-3.0% -5.2% -7.8% -11.1% -15.0% -19.8% -25.7% -32.9% -41.8% -52.8%
-1.2% -3.0% -5.2% -7.8% -11.0% -14.9% -19.7% -25.5% -32.5% -41.3%
-1.2% -3.1% -5.2% -7.8% -11.0% -14.8% -19.5% -25.2% -32.2%
-1.3% -3.1% -5.2% -7.8% -11.0% -14.8% -19.4% -25.0%
-1.3% -3.1% -5.3% -7.8% -10.9% -14.7% -19.2%
-1.4% -3.2% -5.3% -7.8% -10.9% -14.6%
-1.4% -3.2% -5.3% -7.8% -10.9%
-1.5% -3.2% -5.3% -7.8%
2%
3%
4%
5% 0.3%
6% 1.5% 0.2%
7% 2.5% 1.4% 0.2%
8% 3.3% 2.4% 1.4% 0.1%
9% 4.1% 3.3% 2.4% 1.3% 0.1%
10% 4.7% 4.0% 3.2% 2.3% 1.3% 0.0%
i
g
 
Data from: Appendix 4 
 
From Table 16&17, which are analogous to Table 15 and present the 
differences in replacement rates due to policy change, we can conclude that 
for female retirees, especially those in blue-collar jobs, the new policy will be 
better off if and only if <<g . However, when interest rate is much lower than 
the wage growth rate, the replacement rate will be at a very low lever (See 
Table 18). The Replacement rate under the new policy will be under 50% if 
<<g . It can not ensure that the retirees will have a suitable life after retirement, 
and will lead to insufficiency. 
i
i
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Table 18: Replacement Rates under 2005 Policy when <<g , for Woman 
in Blue- collar Jobs (R=50) 
i
   i 
   1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 
5% 39.7% 40.9% 42.4% 44.1% 46.3% 
6% 38.7% 39.7% 41.0% 42.4% 44.2% 
7% 37.9% 38.8% 39.8% 41.0% 42.4% 
8% 37.2% 37.9% 38.8% 39.8% 41.0% 
9% 36.6% 37.3% 38.0% 38.9% 39.9% 
g 
10% 36.1% 36.7% 37.3% 38.0% 38.9% 
Data from: Appendix 4 
 
Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that:  
 
If >>  the new policy is not an improvement for all the retirees; i g
If ≈ , men will benefit from the transition, but women will suffer reduction of 
pension, as discussed in Section 5.1.1; 
i g
If << , all the retirees will be better off, but the pension is probably not 
sufficient for retirees. 
i g
 
Therefore, the difference between i  and  is not the crucial factor that 
affects the policy transition influence. If we want all the retirees to benefit from 
the policy transition, we should find the suitable solutions to make >  no 
matter which relationship is between  and g .  
g
2
Rρ 1Rρ
i
 
Since  is the probability that the worker has a job and contributes to the 
pension system at age t, in general, it is hard to be influenced by the policy. 
Therefore, the possible solutions should be the adjustments to the policy fixed 
parameters. 
),( tas
 
34 
5.2 Results under Non-continuous Employment  
As discussed in the beginning of Sec. 5.1, if under continuous employment, 
< , it is sure that under non-continuous employment,  is also less 
than . It is obvious that, if under non-continuous employment > , it is 
sure that under continuous employment,  is also greater than . 
Therefore, when discussing the solutions to make all the retirees benefit from 
the policy transition, we can just study the model under non-continuous 
employment. 
2
Rρ 1Rρ 2Rρ
1
Rρ 2Rρ 1Rρ
2
Rρ 1Rρ
 
There is four policy fixed parameters, the retirement age R, the accumulation 
rate of individual pension accountϕ , the initial working age , and the 
actuarial factor G
a
R. 
 
GR is calculated from life expectancy, and  is from Chinese census data. 
The last two parameters can’t be adjusted by policy, so the replacement rate 
can be increased only by postponing retirement age or raising the 
accumulation rate. 
a
 
From Section 5.1.2, it is obvious that the difference between  and  is not 
the crucial factor that affects the policy transition influence. It is reasonable to 
set they are equal in the current section. Besides, if I consider ≠  in 
non-continuous employment, this would complicate matters beyond the scope 
of the thesis. 
i g
i g
 
Under = , Eq. (5) for replacement rates under 1997 policy will be: i g
                                            (13) ∑−
=
+=
1
11 ),(1.02.0
R
at
R tasϕρ
Eq. (6) for replacement rates under 2005 policy will be: 
                             (14) ∑−
=
+−−=
1
22 ),(/01.0*)(
R
at
RRR tasGUaR ϕρ
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Assumption B1.2: This retiree has a non-continuous employment before 
retirement; i.e. = 0 at some years (viz. the number of unemployment 
years before retirement U
),( tas
R≠0). 
 
Then Eq. (13) for 1997’s will be: 
                                         (15) )(1.02.0 11 RR UaR −−+= ϕρ
Eq. (14) for 2005’s will be: 
                                     (16) ))(/01.0( 22 RRR UaRG −−+= ϕρ
 
Now we can set ; LRR UaRL −−= R as the working life length (in years) for 
retirees.  
 
S.t. 15< LR< aR − ; according to the policy items. 
 
 It follows, 
                                                 (17) RR L
11 1.02.0 ϕρ +=
                                             (18) RRR LG )/01.0(
22 ϕρ +=
5.2.1 Retirement Age and Working Life Length while ≥  2Rρ 1Rρ
When keeping the accumulation rate of individual pension account ϕ  fixed 
(ϕ  for 1997’s is 11%; for 2005’s is 8%), the retirement age is the only factor 
that causes the gender difference in effects of the policy transition.  
 
If we need ≥  to give retirees at least equal well-being after policy 
transition, the suitable working life length and retirement age is as shown in 
Table 19. 
2
Rρ 1Rρ
 
According to Eq. (17) & (18), whenϕ  is fixed, the replacement rate under 1997 
policy is only dependent on the working life length LR. However, the 
replacement rate under 2005 policy is also influenced by GR. 
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The last column of Table 19 is the replacement rate under 1997 policy 
corresponding to different working life length.  
 
And in 2005 policy, different retirement ages have different GR. Therefore, if 
two retirees retire in different age, although they have equal working life length, 
their replacement rates will not be same.  
 
Table 19: Replacement Rates under Non-continuous Employment 
50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
15 22.4% 22.6% 22.8% 23.0% 23.2% 23.5% 23.8% 24.1% 24.5% 24.9% 25.4% 36.5%
16 23.9% 24.1% 24.3% 24.5% 24.8% 25.0% 25.4% 25.7% 26.1% 26.6% 27.1% 37.6%
17 25.4% 25.6% 25.8% 26.1% 26.3% 26.6% 26.9% 27.3% 27.7% 28.3% 28.7% 38.7%
18 26.9% 27.1% 27.3% 27.6% 27.9% 28.2% 28.5% 28.9% 29.4% 29.9% 30.4% 39.8%
19 28.4% 28.6% 28.9% 29.1% 29.4% 29.7% 30.1% 30.5% 31.0% 31.6% 32.1% 40.9%
20 29.8% 30.1% 30.4% 30.7% 31.0% 31.3% 31.7% 32.1% 32.6% 33.2% 33.8% 42.0%
21 31.3% 31.6% 31.9% 32.2% 32.5% 32.9% 33.3% 33.8% 34.3% 34.9% 35.5% 43.1%
22 32.8% 33.1% 33.4% 33.7% 34.1% 34.4% 34.9% 35.4% 35.9% 36.6% 37.2% 44.2%
23 34.3% 34.6% 34.9% 35.3% 35.6% 36.0% 36.5% 37.0% 37.5% 38.2% 38.9% 45.3%
24 35.8% 36.1% 36.5% 36.8% 37.2% 37.5% 38.0% 38.6% 39.2% 39.9% 40.6% 46.4%
25 37.3% 37.6% 38.0% 38.3% 38.7% 39.1% 39.6% 40.2% 40.8% 41.6% 42.3% 47.5%
26 38.8% 39.1% 39.5% 39.9% 40.3% 40.7% 41.2% 41.8% 42.4% 43.2% 44.0% 48.6%
27 40.3% 40.6% 41.0% 41.4% 41.8% 42.2% 42.8% 43.4% 44.0% 44.9% 45.7% 49.7%
28 41.8% 42.2% 42.5% 42.9% 43.4% 43.8% 44.4% 45.0% 45.7% 46.5% 47.3% 50.8%
29 43.3% 43.7% 44.0% 44.5% 44.9% 45.4% 46.0% 46.6% 47.3% 48.2% 49.0% 51.9%
30 44.8% 45.2% 45.6% 46.0% 46.5% 46.9% 47.6% 48.2% 48.9% 49.9% 50.7% 53.0%
31 46.3% 46.7% 47.1% 47.5% 48.0% 48.5% 49.1% 49.8% 50.6% 51.5% 52.4% 54.1%
32 NA 48.2% 48.6% 49.1% 49.6% 50.1% 50.7% 51.4% 52.2% 53.2% 54.1% 55.2%
33 NA NA 50.1% 50.6% 51.1% 51.6% 52.3% 53.0% 53.8% 54.9% 55.8% 56.3%
34 NA NA NA 52.1% 52.7% 53.2% 53.9% 54.7% 55.5% 56.5% 57.5% 57.4%
35 NA NA NA NA 54.2% 54.8% 55.5% 56.3% 57.1% 58.2% 59.2% 58.5%
36 NA NA NA NA NA 56.3% 57.1% 57.9% 58.7% 59.8% 60.9% 59.6%
37 NA NA NA NA NA NA 58.7% 59.5% 60.4% 61.5% 62.6% 60.7%
38 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 61.1% 62.0% 63.2% 64.3% 61.8%
39 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 63.6% 64.8% 65.9% 62.9%
40 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 66.5% 67.6% 64.0%
41 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 69.3% 65.1%
1997
Policy
2005 Policy (Retirement Age)
L
 
 
There are a few cases in Table 19 when the replacement rate under 2005’s will 
be higher than that under 1997’s. They are: 
 
1) Retirement age R = 58; if working life length LR ≥ 38; 
2) Retirement age R = 59; if working life length LR ≥ 36 
3) Retirement age R = 60; if working life length LR ≥ 34 
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Hereby under the statutory retirement ages (50 or 55), women can not be 
better off. Retirement should be postponed to raise the replacement rate of 
women. 
 
Since  is hard to be influenced by the policy, the working life length can 
not be affected either. However, we can give a possible solution, under which 
the replacement rate under 2005’s can be higher than that under 1997’s. In 
other words, for example, if the worker retires at age 60, he/she will benefit 
from policy transition as long as he/she has worked long enough (L
),( tas
R ≥ 34). But 
if the worker retires at age 55, he/she can not benefit from policy transition 
under any condition. 
 
In conclusion, when keeping ϕ  fixed, the retirement age of women should 
deter to at least 58 (Both Women in Salaried positions and in blue-collar jobs) 
to give female retirees at least the same quality of life after policy transition. 
5.2.2 Higher Accumulation Rates 
As it follows from the description in Ch. 3, another reason which leads to 
insufficiency under 2005 policy is accumulation rate decrease in individual 
account.  in 2005 policy is 8%, while  in 1997’s is 11%.  2ϕ 1ϕ
 
If  can be varied with different types of workers (men, women in salaried 
positions, and women in blue-collar jobs), the replacement rates can be 
equalized between two policies. 
2ϕ
2
Rρ =  1Rρ
From Equation (17) & (18):  RRR LLG
12 1.02.0)/01.0( ϕϕ +=+
 
Inset  according to 1997 policy into the above equation, it follows, %111 =ϕ
                           R
R
R G
L
L001.02.02 +=ϕ                    (19) 
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Table 20 shows the suitable  when the replacement rates are equal in the 
two policies. 
2ϕ
 
Table 20:  under Equal Replacement Rates 
2ϕ
50 55 60
16.25 14.17 11.58
15 23.3% 20.3% 16.6%
16 21.9% 19.1% 15.6%
17 20.7% 18.1% 14.8%
18 19.7% 17.2% 14.0%
19 18.7% 16.3% 13.3%
20 17.9% 15.6% 12.7%
21 17.1% 14.9% 12.2%
22 16.4% 14.3% 11.7%
23 15.8% 13.7% 11.2%
24 15.2% 13.2% 10.8%
25 14.6% 12.8% 10.4%
26 14.1% 12.3% 10.1%
27 13.7% 11.9% 9.7%
28 13.2% 11.5% 9.4%
29 12.8% 11.2% 9.1%
30 12.5% 10.9% 8.9%
31 12.1% 10.6% 8.6%
32 NA 10.3% 8.4%
33 NA 10.0% 8.2%
34 NA 9.8% 8.0%
35 NA 9.5% 7.8%
36 NA 9.3% 7.6%
37 NA NA 7.4%
38 NA NA 7.3%
39 NA NA 7.1%
40 NA NA 6.9%
41 NA NA 6.8%
L
R & G2ϕ
 
 
1) For women in blue-collar jobs: can be equal to or greater than  if 
≥ 12.1% 
2
Rρ 1Rρ
2ϕ
2) For women in salaried positions: can be equal to or greater than  if 
≥ 9.3% 
2
Rρ 1Rρ
2ϕ
3) For men: can be equal to or greater than  if ≥ 6.8% 2Rρ 1Rρ 2ϕ
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Therefore, we can set different  in 2005 policy in order that all the retirees 
can live at least of the same quality as under 1997 policy. 
2ϕ
5.2.3 The Combination of Higher Retirement Age and Accumulation 
Rates 
If we only postpone the retirement ages to ensure women equal pensions, the 
retirement age for women in blue-collar jobs should change from 50 to 58. 
Similarly, if we only raise the accumulation rate in individual accounts, it should 
raise from 8% to 12% for women in blue-collar jobs. 
 
However we can think about a combination of these two methods, which is 
raising the two together to more appropriate levels. First of all, for policy design, 
the retirement age and accumulation rate are better to be integers. Thus it is 
reasonable to find suitable R for  from 9% to 11% (See Table 21 to 23). 2ϕ
 
Table 21: Replacement Rates under =9% 2ϕ
50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
15 23.3% 23.5% 23.8% 24.0% 24.3% 24.5% 24.9% 25.3% 25.7% 26.2% 26.7% 36.5%
16 24.9% 25.1% 25.3% 25.6% 25.9% 26.2% 26.5% 26.9% 27.4% 27.9% 28.4% 37.6%
17 26.4% 26.7% 26.9% 27.2% 27.5% 27.8% 28.2% 28.6% 29.1% 29.7% 30.2% 38.7%
18 28.0% 28.2% 28.5% 28.8% 29.1% 29.4% 29.9% 30.3% 30.8% 31.4% 32.0% 39.8%
19 29.5% 29.8% 30.1% 30.4% 30.7% 31.1% 31.5% 32.0% 32.5% 33.2% 33.8% 40.9%
20 31.1% 31.4% 31.7% 32.0% 32.3% 32.7% 33.2% 33.7% 34.2% 34.9% 35.5% 42.0%
21 32.6% 32.9% 33.3% 33.6% 34.0% 34.3% 34.8% 35.4% 35.9% 36.6% 37.3% 43.1%
22 34.2% 34.5% 34.8% 35.2% 35.6% 36.0% 36.5% 37.0% 37.6% 38.4% 39.1% 44.2%
23 35.7% 36.1% 36.4% 36.8% 37.2% 37.6% 38.1% 38.7% 39.3% 40.1% 40.9% 45.3%
24 37.3% 37.6% 38.0% 38.4% 38.8% 39.2% 39.8% 40.4% 41.0% 41.9% 42.7% 46.4%
25 38.8% 39.2% 39.6% 40.0% 40.4% 40.9% 41.5% 42.1% 42.8% 43.6% 44.4% 47.5%
26 40.4% 40.8% 41.2% 41.6% 42.0% 42.5% 43.1% 43.8% 44.5% 45.4% 46.2% 48.6%
27 42.0% 42.4% 42.8% 43.2% 43.7% 44.1% 44.8% 45.5% 46.2% 47.1% 48.0% 49.7%
28 43.5% 43.9% 44.3% 44.8% 45.3% 45.8% 46.4% 47.1% 47.9% 48.9% 49.8% 50.8%
29 45.1% 45.5% 45.9% 46.4% 46.9% 47.4% 48.1% 48.8% 49.6% 50.6% 51.5% 51.9%
30 46.6% 47.1% 47.5% 48.0% 48.5% 49.1% 49.8% 50.5% 51.3% 52.4% 53.3% 53.0%
31 48.2% 48.6% 49.1% 49.6% 50.1% 50.7% 51.4% 52.2% 53.0% 54.1% 55.1% 54.1%
32 NA 50.2% 50.7% 51.2% 51.8% 52.3% 53.1% 53.9% 54.7% 55.8% 56.9% 55.2%
33 NA NA 52.3% 52.8% 53.4% 54.0% 54.7% 55.6% 56.4% 57.6% 58.6% 56.3%
34 NA NA NA 54.4% 55.0% 55.6% 56.4% 57.2% 58.2% 59.3% 60.4% 57.4%
35 NA NA NA NA 56.6% 57.2% 58.0% 58.9% 59.9% 61.1% 62.2% 58.5%
36 NA NA NA NA NA 58.9% 59.7% 60.6% 61.6% 62.8% 64.0% 59.6%
37 NA NA NA NA NA NA 61.4% 62.3% 63.3% 64.6% 65.8% 60.7%
38 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 64.0% 65.0% 66.3% 67.5% 61.8%
39 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 66.7% 68.1% 69.3% 62.9%
40 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 69.8% 71.1% 64.0%
41 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 72.9% 65.1%
1997
Policy
2005 Policy, the accumulative rate of individual pension account is 9%
L
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Table 22: Replacement Rates under =10% 2ϕ
50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
15 24.2% 24.5% 24.7% 25.0% 25.3% 25.6% 26.0% 26.4% 26.8% 27.4% 28.0% 36.5%
16 25.8% 26.1% 26.4% 26.7% 27.0% 27.3% 27.7% 28.1% 28.6% 29.2% 29.8% 37.6%
17 27.5% 27.7% 28.0% 28.3% 28.7% 29.0% 29.4% 29.9% 30.4% 31.1% 31.7% 38.7%
18 29.1% 29.4% 29.7% 30.0% 30.3% 30.7% 31.2% 31.7% 32.2% 32.9% 33.5% 39.8%
19 30.7% 31.0% 31.3% 31.7% 32.0% 32.4% 32.9% 33.4% 34.0% 34.7% 35.4% 40.9%
20 32.3% 32.6% 33.0% 33.3% 33.7% 34.1% 34.6% 35.2% 35.8% 36.6% 37.3% 42.0%
21 33.9% 34.3% 34.6% 35.0% 35.4% 35.8% 36.4% 36.9% 37.6% 38.4% 39.1% 43.1%
22 35.5% 35.9% 36.3% 36.7% 37.1% 37.5% 38.1% 38.7% 39.4% 40.2% 41.0% 44.2%
23 37.2% 37.5% 37.9% 38.3% 38.8% 39.2% 39.8% 40.5% 41.2% 42.0% 42.9% 45.3%
24 38.8% 39.2% 39.6% 40.0% 40.5% 40.9% 41.6% 42.2% 42.9% 43.9% 44.7% 46.4%
25 40.4% 40.8% 41.2% 41.7% 42.1% 42.6% 43.3% 44.0% 44.7% 45.7% 46.6% 47.5%
26 42.0% 42.4% 42.9% 43.3% 43.8% 44.3% 45.0% 45.7% 46.5% 47.5% 48.5% 48.6%
27 43.6% 44.1% 44.5% 45.0% 45.5% 46.1% 46.8% 47.5% 48.3% 49.4% 50.3% 49.7%
28 45.2% 45.7% 46.2% 46.7% 47.2% 47.8% 48.5% 49.3% 50.1% 51.2% 52.2% 50.8%
29 46.8% 47.3% 47.8% 48.3% 48.9% 49.5% 50.2% 51.0% 51.9% 53.0% 54.0% 51.9%
30 48.5% 49.0% 49.5% 50.0% 50.6% 51.2% 51.9% 52.8% 53.7% 54.8% 55.9% 53.0%
31 50.1% 50.6% 51.1% 51.7% 52.3% 52.9% 53.7% 54.5% 55.5% 56.7% 57.8% 54.1%
32 NA 52.2% 52.8% 53.3% 53.9% 54.6% 55.4% 56.3% 57.3% 58.5% 59.6% 55.2%
33 NA NA 54.4% 55.0% 55.6% 56.3% 57.1% 58.1% 59.0% 60.3% 61.5% 56.3%
34 NA NA NA 56.7% 57.3% 58.0% 58.9% 59.8% 60.8% 62.1% 63.4% 57.4%
35 NA NA NA NA 59.0% 59.7% 60.6% 61.6% 62.6% 64.0% 65.2% 58.5%
36 NA NA NA NA NA 61.4% 62.3% 63.3% 64.4% 65.8% 67.1% 59.6%
37 NA NA NA NA NA NA 64.1% 65.1% 66.2% 67.6% 69.0% 60.7%
38 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 66.9% 68.0% 69.5% 70.8% 61.8%
39 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 69.8% 71.3% 72.7% 62.9%
40 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 73.1% 74.5% 64.0%
41 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 76.4% 65.1%
2005 Policy, the accumulative rate of individual pension account is 10% 1997
Policy
L
 
 
Table 23: Replacement Rates under =11% 2ϕ
50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
15 25.2% 25.4% 25.7% 26.0% 26.3% 26.6% 27.1% 27.5% 28.0% 28.7% 29.2% 36.5%
16 26.8% 27.1% 27.4% 27.7% 28.1% 28.4% 28.9% 29.4% 29.9% 30.6% 31.2% 37.6%
17 28.5% 28.8% 29.1% 29.5% 29.8% 30.2% 30.7% 31.2% 31.8% 32.5% 33.1% 38.7%
18 30.2% 30.5% 30.8% 31.2% 31.6% 32.0% 32.5% 33.0% 33.6% 34.4% 35.1% 39.8%
19 31.9% 32.2% 32.6% 32.9% 33.3% 33.7% 34.3% 34.9% 35.5% 36.3% 37.0% 40.9%
20 33.5% 33.9% 34.3% 34.7% 35.1% 35.5% 36.1% 36.7% 37.4% 38.2% 39.0% 42.0%
21 35.2% 35.6% 36.0% 36.4% 36.8% 37.3% 37.9% 38.5% 39.2% 40.1% 40.9% 43.1%
22 36.9% 37.3% 37.7% 38.1% 38.6% 39.1% 39.7% 40.4% 41.1% 42.0% 42.9% 44.2%
23 38.6% 39.0% 39.4% 39.9% 40.4% 40.9% 41.5% 42.2% 43.0% 43.9% 44.8% 45.3%
24 40.2% 40.7% 41.1% 41.6% 42.1% 42.6% 43.3% 44.0% 44.8% 45.9% 46.8% 46.4%
25 41.9% 42.4% 42.8% 43.3% 43.9% 44.4% 45.1% 45.9% 46.7% 47.8% 48.7% 47.5%
26 43.6% 44.1% 44.5% 45.1% 45.6% 46.2% 46.9% 47.7% 48.6% 49.7% 50.7% 48.6%
27 45.3% 45.8% 46.3% 46.8% 47.4% 48.0% 48.7% 49.6% 50.4% 51.6% 52.6% 49.7%
28 47.0% 47.5% 48.0% 48.5% 49.1% 49.7% 50.5% 51.4% 52.3% 53.5% 54.6% 50.8%
29 48.6% 49.2% 49.7% 50.3% 50.9% 51.5% 52.3% 53.2% 54.2% 55.4% 56.5% 51.9%
30 50.3% 50.8% 51.4% 52.0% 52.6% 53.3% 54.1% 55.1% 56.0% 57.3% 58.5% 53.0%
31 52.0% 52.5% 53.1% 53.7% 54.4% 55.1% 55.9% 56.9% 57.9% 59.2% 60.4% 54.1%
32 NA 54.2% 54.8% 55.5% 56.1% 56.8% 57.7% 58.7% 59.8% 61.1% 62.4% 55.2%
33 NA NA 56.5% 57.2% 57.9% 58.6% 59.6% 60.6% 61.7% 63.0% 64.3% 56.3%
34 NA NA NA 58.9% 59.7% 60.4% 61.4% 62.4% 63.5% 65.0% 66.3% 57.4%
35 NA NA NA NA 61.4% 62.2% 63.2% 64.2% 65.4% 66.9% 68.2% 58.5%
36 NA NA NA NA NA 63.9% 65.0% 66.1% 67.3% 68.8% 70.2% 59.6%
37 NA NA NA NA NA NA 66.8% 67.9% 69.1% 70.7% 72.1% 60.7%
38 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 69.7% 71.0% 72.6% 74.1% 61.8%
39 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 72.9% 74.5% 76.0% 62.9%
40 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 76.4% 78.0% 64.0%
41 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 79.9% 65.1%
1997
Policy
2005 Policy, the accumulative rate of individual pension account is 11%
L
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In a word, we can find the lowest R for each  as follows, which can be use 
to draw a joint policy adjustment.  
2ϕ
 
1) R= 58 when =8%; 2ϕ
2) R= 56 when =9%; 2ϕ
3) R= 54 when =10%; 2ϕ
4) R= 52 when =11%; 2ϕ
5) R= 51 when =12%; 2ϕ
6) R= 50 when =13%; 2ϕ
 
 
 
42 
6. Conclusions 
First of all, this paper focuses on the comparison of pension replacement rates 
between old and new policies in China. Although China’s pension system has 
a lot of other serious issues such as how to finance old age persons in rural 
China, or how to transit from the old unfunded system to the new 
arrangements, I believe it is important to discuss the effects of new policy for a 
single urban retiree.  
 
From the description on how the pension policies have been changed during 
the last 60 years, it can be concluded that pension reform in China is aimed to 
change the system from the unfunded one to a long-time effective self-funded 
pension system. The transition from old policy (1997) to the new one (2005) is 
mainly because of the short-comings in the individual accounts which should 
be compensated by both central and local governments, but the effects to 
individual pension benefits are considered less. However, since the basic 
pension is the only financial support for most Chinese retirees, and the 
replacement level under old policy is not superfluous, in general, a new 
pension policy should give corrected to give the retirees at least equal 
well-being.  
 
The analysis undertaken for comparing the replacement rates under the two 
policies in this thesis can be summarized in the following scheme (See Figure 
11).  
 
First the comparison is performed under the assumption of continuous 
employment. Results show that: if >>g  the new policy is not an improvement 
for all the retirees; if i≈g , male retirees benefit from the transition, while 
female retirees suffer a pension reduction, especially women working in 
blue-collar jobs; if <<g , all the retirees will be better off, but the pension level 
is probably not sufficient for all retirees. 
i
i
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Figure 11: Insufficiency under 2005’s and Possible Solutions 
i = g  
Male retirees are 
benefit from the 
transition, while Female 
retirees suffer pension 
reduction.
i ≠ g  
If i >> g , 2Rρ < 1Rρ  for all 
the retirees; If i << g , all 
the retirees will be better off, 
but the pensions are not 
sufficient for all retirees.
If under continual 
employment, 2Rρ < 1Rρ , it 
is sure that under 
non-continual employment, 
2
Rρ is also less than 1Rρ .
The difference between i  and g  is not the crucial 
factor that affects the policy transition influence. 
Continual 
Employment 
Non-continual 
Employment 
The replacement rate under 
non-continual employment 
is less than that of continual
employment. 
R, ϕ , a 
and  GR 
are fixed 
The new policy is not a 
Pareto improvement to 
all the retirees. 
Solution Ⅰ 
 
R ≥ 58 for all 
women 
Solution Ⅱ 
2ϕ  ≥ 12.1% for women in 
blue-collar jobs; 
2ϕ  ≥ 9.3% for women in 
salaried positions; 
Solution Ⅲ 
Combination of 
higher retirement age 
and higher
accumulative rates
2
Rρ  VS 1Rρ  
The new policy is an
advantage for the retirees who 
had longer working careers. 
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It is shown in policy comparison that the new policy gives the advantage to 
retirees who had longer working careers. Thus if under continuous 
employment, the replacement rates under the new policy are less than those 
under the old one ( < ), it is sure that under non-continuous employment, 
 is also less than .  
2
Rρ 1Rρ
2
Rρ 1Rρ
 
The numerical results indicate that the new policy is not a Pareto improvement 
when the policy fixed parameters are not adjusted. In most cases, the male 
retirees benefit from the transition, while female retirees suffer a pension 
reduction, especially the women working in blue-collar jobs. 
 
Three possible solutions are suggested in this work, which include adjusting 
the statutory retirement age, raising the contribution rate in individual account 
or the combination of both as in Figure 11. The explanations in Sec. 2.4 show 
that now the total contribution rate in China is very high compared to those of 
other regions, while the statutory retirement age for females in China is lower 
than most of other Asian countries. Therefore, a suitable plan could be 
postponing female retirement age step by step while raising accumulation rate 
in individual pension accounts by 2 or 3 percent points. 
 
There are some challenges which may make the implementation of the 
suggested remedies. One is the unemployment rate in China which I have 
mentioned before. In 1978 Amendments, the government once lowed the 
statutory retirement age to give room for younger workers. Thus if the 
unemployment rate rises in China, which is reasonable due to the current 
financial crises, the statutory female retirement age will hardly be raised. 
Another challenge is aging problem, it can lower the unemployment rate in a 
certain extent; however, it will cause more expenditures and fewer 
contributions in the social pool of the pension system.  This means 
short-comings will occur in individual accounts again, which will lead to the 
government rethinking of the 2005 policy and probably cause it to set an even 
lower accumulation rate in individual pension accounts in order to raise that of 
the social pool. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 
 
Table A1: Dependency Ratio and Coverage (1989-2007) 
 Year
Contributors
(10,000
persons)
 Recipients
(10,000
persons)
Dependency
Ratio
Urban
Employees
(10,000 persons)
Coverage (%
of urban
employees)
1989 4816.9 893.4 5.39 14390 39.7%
 1990 5200.7 965.3 5.39 17041 36.2%
 1991 5653.7 1086.6 5.20 17465 38.6%
1992 7774.7 1681.5 4.62 17861 52.9%
1993 8008.2 1839.4 4.35 18262 53.9%
1994 8494.1 2079.4 4.08 18653 56.7%
1995 8737.8 2241.2 3.90 19040 57.7%
1996 8758.4 2358.3 3.71 19922 55.8%
1997 8670.9 2533.0 3.42 20781 53.9%
1998 8475.8 2727.3 3.11 21616 51.8%
1999 9501.8 2983.6 3.18 22412 55.7%
2000 10447.5 3169.9 3.30 23151 58.8%
2001 10801.9 3380.6 3.20 23940 59.2%
2002 11128.8 3607.8 3.08 24780 59.5%
2003 11646.5 3860.2 3.02 25639 60.5%
2004 12250.3 4102.6 2.99 26476 61.8%
2005 13120.4 4367.5 3.00 27331 64.0%
2006 14130.9 4635.4 3.05 28310 66.3%
2007 15183.2 4953.7 3.07 29350 68.6%  
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Table A2: Growth Rates of Recipients and Contributors (1990-2007) 
 Year  Growth Rateof Recipients
Growth Rate of
Contributors
1990 8.0% 8.0%
1991 12.6% 8.7%
1992 54.8% 37.5%
1993 9.4% 3.0%
1994 13.0% 6.1%
1995 7.8% 2.9%
1996 5.2% 0.2%
1997 7.4% -1.0%
1998 7.7% -2.3%
1999 9.4% 12.1%
2000 6.2% 10.0%
2001 6.6% 3.4%
2002 6.7% 3.0%
2003 7.0% 4.7%
2004 6.3% 5.2%
2005 6.5% 7.1%
2006 6.1% 7.7%
2007 6.9% 7.4%  
Data from: China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2008. 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Table A3: Contribution Rates and Account and Account Accumulation 
Rates in 1997 Policy Design 
year Enterprises’Contribution
Employees’
Contribution
Total
Contribution
Individual Account
Accumulation
Social Pool
Accumulation
97-98 20% 4% 24% 11% 13%
99-00 20% 5% 25% 11% 14%
01-02 20% 6% 26% 11% 15%
03-04 20% 7% 27% 11% 16%
2005 20% 8% 28% 11% 17%  
Data from: “Decision of the State Council on Establishment of Unified Basic Old Age 
Insurance System for Enterprise Staff and Workers” (1997 Policy),. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Table A4: Replacement Rates under 1997 Policy when i ≠ g for Woman in 
Salaried Positions (R=55) 
   i 
    1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
1% 59.6% 67.8% 78.1% 91.2% 108.0% 129.5% 157.0% 192.4% 238.1% 297.0%
2% 53.2% 59.6% 67.7% 77.9% 90.8% 107.3% 128.3% 155.2% 189.7% 234.1%
3% 48.1% 53.2% 59.6% 67.6% 77.7% 90.4% 106.6% 127.1% 153.4% 187.1%
4% 44.1% 48.2% 53.3% 59.6% 67.5% 77.4% 90.0% 105.9% 126.0% 151.7%
5% 40.9% 44.2% 48.3% 53.3% 59.6% 67.4% 77.2% 89.6% 105.2% 125.0%
6% 38.3% 41.0% 44.3% 48.4% 53.4% 59.6% 67.3% 77.0% 89.2% 104.5%
7% 36.2% 38.4% 41.1% 44.4% 48.5% 53.4% 59.6% 67.3% 76.8% 88.8%
8% 34.4% 36.3% 38.5% 41.2% 44.5% 48.6% 53.5% 59.6% 67.2% 76.6%
9% 33.0% 34.6% 36.4% 38.7% 41.4% 44.6% 48.6% 53.5% 59.6% 67.1%
g 
10% 31.8% 33.1% 34.7% 36.5% 38.8% 41.5% 44.7% 48.7% 53.6% 59.6%
 
Table A5: Replacement Rates under 2005 Policy when i ≠ g for Woman in 
Salaried Positions (R=55) 
 
   i 
    1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
1% 56.3% 60.5% 65.8% 72.5% 81.1% 92.1% 106.2% 124.3% 147.7% 177.9%
2% 53.0% 56.3% 60.4% 65.6% 72.3% 80.7% 91.5% 105.2% 122.9% 145.6%
3% 50.4% 53.0% 56.3% 60.4% 65.5% 72.1% 80.3% 90.9% 104.3% 121.6%
4% 48.4% 50.5% 53.0% 56.3% 60.3% 65.4% 71.8% 80.0% 90.3% 103.5%
5% 46.7% 48.4% 50.5% 53.1% 56.3% 60.3% 65.3% 71.6% 79.6% 89.8%
6% 45.4% 46.8% 48.5% 50.5% 53.1% 56.3% 60.2% 65.2% 71.4% 79.3%
7% 44.3% 45.4% 46.8% 48.5% 50.6% 53.1% 56.3% 60.2% 65.1% 71.2%
8% 43.4% 44.4% 45.5% 46.9% 48.6% 50.6% 53.2% 56.3% 60.2% 65.0%
9% 42.7% 43.5% 44.4% 45.6% 46.9% 48.6% 50.7% 53.2% 56.3% 60.1%
g 
10% 42.0% 42.7% 43.5% 44.5% 45.6% 47.0% 48.7% 50.7% 53.2% 56.3%
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Appendix 4 
 
Table A6: Replacement Rates under 1997 Policy when i ≠ g for Woman in 
Blue- collar Jobs (R=50) 
   i 
    1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
1% 54.1% 60.1% 67.4% 76.4% 87.4% 101.0% 117.8% 138.5% 164.2% 196.1%
2% 49.2% 54.1% 60.0% 67.2% 76.1% 86.9% 100.2% 116.7% 136.9% 162.0%
3% 45.3% 49.3% 54.1% 59.9% 67.1% 75.8% 86.4% 99.5% 115.6% 135.4%
4% 42.1% 45.4% 49.3% 54.1% 59.9% 66.9% 75.5% 86.0% 98.8% 114.6%
5% 39.4% 42.2% 45.4% 49.4% 54.1% 59.8% 66.8% 75.2% 85.5% 98.2%
6% 37.3% 39.5% 42.3% 45.5% 49.4% 54.1% 59.8% 66.6% 75.0% 85.1%
7% 35.4% 37.3% 39.6% 42.3% 45.6% 49.4% 54.1% 59.7% 66.5% 74.7%
8% 33.9% 35.5% 37.4% 39.7% 42.4% 45.6% 49.5% 54.1% 59.7% 66.4%
9% 32.6% 34.0% 35.6% 37.5% 39.8% 42.5% 45.7% 49.5% 54.1% 59.6%
g 
10% 31.5% 32.7% 34.1% 35.7% 37.6% 39.9% 42.6% 45.8% 49.6% 54.1%
 
 
Table A7: Replacement Rates under 2005 Policy when i ≠ g for Woman in 
Blue- collar Jobs (R=50) 
   i 
    1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
1% 46.3% 48.9% 52.2% 56.2% 61.2% 67.2% 74.8% 84.0% 95.6% 109.8%
2% 44.1% 46.3% 48.9% 52.1% 56.1% 60.9% 66.9% 74.3% 83.3% 94.6%
3% 42.3% 44.1% 46.3% 48.9% 52.1% 56.0% 60.7% 66.6% 73.8% 82.7%
4% 40.9% 42.4% 44.1% 46.3% 48.9% 52.0% 55.8% 60.5% 66.3% 73.3%
5% 39.7% 40.9% 42.4% 44.1% 46.3% 48.8% 51.9% 55.7% 60.3% 66.0%
6% 38.7% 39.7% 41.0% 42.4% 44.2% 46.3% 48.8% 51.9% 55.6% 60.1%
7% 37.9% 38.8% 39.8% 41.0% 42.4% 44.2% 46.3% 48.8% 51.8% 55.5%
8% 37.2% 37.9% 38.8% 39.8% 41.0% 42.5% 44.2% 46.3% 48.7% 51.7%
9% 36.6% 37.3% 38.0% 38.9% 39.9% 41.1% 42.5% 44.2% 46.3% 48.7%
g 
10% 36.1% 36.7% 37.3% 38.0% 38.9% 39.9% 41.1% 42.5% 44.2% 46.3%
 
 
 
 
